Composición del ejército de Alejandro y de los refuerzos que recibió

Tamaño del ejército de Alejandro al invadir Asia el año 334: 9.000 pezhetairoi, 3.000 hipaspistas, 2.000 Hetairoi.
El año 333 Alejandro recibió como refuerzos en dos tandas: 3.300 macedonios, 5.800
El año 331 Alejandro recibió 6.500 refuerzos. Según Arriano Alejandro recibió en verano 6.000 macedonios de infantería, 500 jinetes macedonios y  9.000 otros.
En total entre los años 334 a. C. y 324. a. C. Alejandro recibió 30.000 macedonios de refuerzo. (Diez años de refuerzo son 20 turnos en el juego).

En el 326 Mennón llegó con 5.000 o 6.000 jinetes tracios y 7.000 de infantería.
Los primeros asiáticos al servicio de Alejandro fueron lanzadores de jabalina a caballo reclutados en Media. Más tarde reclutó jinetes bactrianos, sogdianos y escitas en Hircania, Bactria y Sogdiana.

Ver Desperta Ferro
Refuerzos en India: 30.000 infantes y 6.000 jinetes que según una versión eran griegos aliados y tropas mercenarias.
Llegada refuerzos a India mandados por Harpalus desde Asia Menor: 5.000 jientes tracios y 7.000 de infantería.
30.000 epigonoi
Alejandro contrató entre 60.000 y 100.000 mercenarios.

Curtius in his description of the forces that Alexander left Macedonia with says that there were Thracians, Peloponnese and Macedonians making up the force crossing into Asia Minor.¹ Diodorus also lists the different nationalities that made up Alexadner’s army, “Odyrsians, Triballians, and Illyrians…Thessalians…six hundred from the rest of Greece…and nine hundred Thracian and Paeonian…”² Clearly Alexander’s army was not just Macedonians, but a slice of Hellenic culture.

1 QCR V39

2 Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, XVII 17.3.

25.OOO EN EL HELESPONTO? CON O SIN PARMENIÓN?

 

Diodorus provides a similar number of men in Alexander’s army as well: “making up a total of thirty-two thousand foot soldiers. Of cavalry…making a total of forty five hundred cavalry. These were the men who crossed with Alexander to Asia.”¹ In Diodorus’ account however is useful information that although not 100% trustworthy is worth of note. Diodorus relates that Aristobulus gave figures of 30,000-foot soldiers and 4000 cavalry, and Ptolemy gave 30,000-foot soldiers and five thousand cavalry. Both of these figures are right in line with the numbers the complete sources give us, but one further one bears note:

1 DS xvii 17.3. Note that Diodorus places numbers and nationalities with the cavalry and they add up to a total of 5,100 not 4,500 as he states. Most likely the final total Diodorus gives is wrong and the numbers corresponding with the troops is correct. 

 

Arrian related that Alexander had “not much more than 30,000 infantry, including light troops and archers, and over 5,000 cavalry.”¹ It is important to note that Arrian does reference some of the other primary sources, making it clear that he was aware of some of the other authors higher figures and chooses to make Alexander’s army smaller. The figure from Arrian is also probably more realistic as it is unlikely that Alexander could have left Macedon with many more foot soldiers and still left behind the substantial force of 12,000-foot soldiers with Antipeter.

1 Arrian, I 11.

 

Nevertheless, the main force in Alexander’s army was always his prized Macedonian troops, of which they’re numbered about 15,000.¹

1 Bosworth, 266

 

Arrian, as stated earlier, is the most reliable source from this ancient period and as such bears more creditability than any other source alone. Arrian tells us that at the battle of Gaugamela “The total strength of Alexander’s army was 7,000 cavalry and 40,000 foot.”¹ Although I have partially rejected Arrian’s total in the past, the total arrived at was similar. With this in mind accepting this figure makes sense because both old totals are very similar. How then did Alexander’s army grow by almost 15,000 men and cavalry in the span between his departure from Macedon and the battle of Gaugamela?

1 Arrian, III 13

 

We are told by Diodorus Siculus that Alexander received “five hundred Macedonian Cavalry and six thousand infantry, six hundred Thracian cavalry and three thousand five hundred Trallians and from the Peloponnese four thousand infantry and little less than a thousand cavalry.”¹ Adding these figures to the total arrived at before, the size of Alexander’s army as he marched out pursuing Darius from Babylon can be numbered at about 50,000 men comprising foot soldiers and cavalry; About 6000 cavalry and 44,000 foot soldiers. This number is of course very similar to the figure given by Arrian as Alexander marched into the battle of Gaugamela. Diodorus details the battle and is very clear to say that Alexander received his reinforcements following the great battle, so if the sources are talking about the same soldiers, there is a vast discrepancy.

1 DS, XVII 65

2 Arrian, III 1
 TROPAS DE ALEJANDRO AL LLEGAR A ASIA

“seven thousand allies…five thousand mercenaries…Odrysians, Triballians and Illyrians accompanied him…there were eighteen hundred Macedonians…eighteen hundred Thessalians…nine hundred Thracian and Paeonian…”¹ Diodorus tells us that when Alexander received reinforcements from Antipeter following Gaugemela, the reinforcements were from all over Greece and Macedonia.

1 DS, XVII 17.3

RECLUTAMIENTO DE EGIPCIOS, ASIÁTICOS, JINETES PERSAS Y TROPAS INDIAS

bATALLA DE ISSOS
 The size of the Hellenic army may not have exceeded 40,000 men, including their other allies, led by Alexander. Alexander's army may have consisted of about 22,000 phalangites and hoplites, 13,000 peltasts, and 5,850 cavalry

 El ejército de Alejandro consistía en 12 000 falangitas, 3000 hipaspistas, 7000 hoplitas. La caballería de Alejandro tenía 2100 hetairoi, 2100 tesalios, 600 prodromoi, 760 griegos y 300 peonios. Alejandro también contaba con hostigadores compuestos por 6000 tracios, 5000 griegos, 1000 ilirios y 1000 cretenses. 

 BATALLA DEL GRANICUS
32,000 infantry (12,000 Macedonians, 5,000 mercenaries, 7,000 Greeks, 7,000 Odrysians, Triballians and Illyrians, and 1,000 archers)
5,100 cavalry (1,800 Macedonians, 1,800 Thessalians, 600 other Greeks, and 900 Thracians and Paeonians)

bATALLA DE GAUGAMELA
 Alexander commanded Greek forces from his kingdom of Macedon and the Hellenic League, along with Greek mercenaries and levies from the Paeonian and Thracian tributary peoples. According to Arrian, the most reliable historian of Alexander (who is believed to be relying on the work of the eyewitness Ptolemy), his forces numbered 7,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry. Most historians agree that the Macedonian army consisted of 31,000 heavy infantry, including mercenaries and hoplite from other allied Greek states in reserve, with an additional 9,000 light infantry consisting mainly of peltasts with some archers. The size of the Greek mounted arm was about 7,000.^[1]
Macedonios: El ejército sumaba 7.000 jinetes y 40.000 infantes. La caballería pesada de élite de Alejandro eran los Hetairoi (Compañeros) y estaba formada por la nobleza macedonia, que acompañaba a Alejandro en esta batalla y fueron el factor decisivo en la batalla. El resto de la caballería se dividía en jinetes tesalios (pesados), caballería tracia (ligera) y algunos jinetes griegos. La infantería de Alejandro se dividía en pesada, la falange y los hipaspistas (cuerpo especializado que cubría los huecos de la poco flexible falange) y la infantería ligera, tracios, agrianos (estos últimos lanzadores de jabalinas que destrozaron a los carros en esta batalla) y hoplitas griegos que intervinieron para cubrir la retaguardia de la falange. 

Batalla de Magnesia

      La batalla de Magnesia según Tito Livio

       Había dos legiones romanas y dos legiones de latinos y aliados, cada una conteniendo 5.000 hombres.

     Las tropas auxiliares de Eumentes estaban formadas por 3.000 caetrati aqueos (más honderos, lanzadores de jabalina y arqueros cretenses).

     Había 3.000 jinetes, 800 de Eumenes y 2.200 romanos.

     Además había caballería Thrallian y cretense, con 500 soldados cada una.

     2.000 voluntarios macedonios y tracios

     El ejército de Seleuco III Megas incluía

     16.000 infantes de estilo macedonio

     1.500 infantería galogriega

     3.000 jinetes catafractos vestidos con mallas

     1.000 jinetes de la agema formada por medos

     argiráspides

     1.200 jinetes dahae

     3.000 infantería ligera mitad cretenses y mitad tralles

     2.500 arqueros misios

     honderos kurdos y arqueros elamitas

     1.500 infantería galogriega

     2.000 capadocios armados como los galogriegos

     2.700 fuerza mezclada

     3.000 catafractos

     3.000 caballería real, parecidos a los catafractos pero menos protegidos. Eran sirios, frigios y lidios

      arqueros árabes en camello

     tarentinos

    2.500 caballería galogriega

     1.000 neocretenses

1.500 carios y lidios

1.500 tralles

4.000 caetrati pisidios, panfilios y lidios           

      

39

When the consul saw that he declined to give battle, he summoned a council of war for the next day to decide what he was to do if Antiochus did not give them the opportunity of fighting. Winter, he said, was coming on; either he would have to keep the soldiers in their tents or else, if he wished to go into winter quarters, operations would have to be suspended till the summer. For none of their enemies did the Romans ever feel greater contempt. From all sides they called upon him to lead them out to battle and to take full advantage of the ardour of the soldiers. If the enemy would not come out, they were ready to charge over the fosses and rampart and rush the camp, for it was not as though they had to fight with so many thousands of men, but rather to slaughter so many thousands of cattle. Cn. Domitius was sent to reconnoitre the ground and find out at what point the enemy's rampart could be best approached, and after he had brought definite and complete information it was decided to move the camp on the morrow nearer the enemy. On the third day the standards were advanced into the middle of the plain and the line formed. Antiochus, on his side, felt that he ought not to hesitate any longer lest he should depress the spirits of his own men and raise the hopes of the enemy by declining battle. He led his forces out just far enough from his camp to make it appear that he intended to fight.

The Roman army was practically uniform as regards both the men and their equipment; there were two Roman legions and two of Latins and allies, each containing 5000 men. The Romans occupied the centre, the Latins the wings. The standards of the hastati were in front, then came those of the principes, and last of all the triarii. Beyond these, whom we may call the regulars, the consul drew up on his right, level with them, the auxiliary troops of Eumenes who were incorporated with the Achaean caetrati, amounting to about 3000 men; beyond them again were stationed nearly 3000 cavalry, 800 of which were furnished by Eumenes, the rest being Romans. Outside these were posted the Trallian and Cretan horse, each body numbering 500 troopers. The left wing was not considered to need so much support as it rested on the river and was protected by the precipitous banks; four squadrons of cavalry, however, were lined up at that end. This was the total strength which the Romans brought into the field. In addition to these, however, there was a mixed force of Macedonians and Thracians, 2000 in all, who had followed as volunteers; they were left to guard the camp. The sixteen elephants were placed in reserve behind the triarii; they could not possibly stand against the king's elephants, of which there were fifty-four, and the African elephants are no match for the Indian elephants even when the numbers are equal, for the latter are much larger and fight with more determination.

40

The king's army was a motley force drawn from many nations and presented the greatest dissimilarity both in the men and their equipment. There were 16,000 infantry in the Macedonian fashion. known as the "phalanx." These formed the centre, and their front consisted of ten divisions; between each division stood two elephants. They were thirty-two ranks deep. This was the main strength of the king's army and it presented a most formidable appearance, especially with the elephants towering high above the men. The effect was heightened by the frontlets and crests on the animals, and the towers on their backs on which stood the drivers, each accompanied by four soldiers. On the right of the phalanx Antiochus stationed 1500 Gallograeci infantry, and with them were linked up 3000 cavalry, clad in mail armour and known as "cataphracti." These were supported by the "agema," another body of cavalry numbering about 1000; they were a select force, consisting of Medes and men drawn from many tribes in that part of the world. Behind these in support were sixteen elephants. The line was continued by the royal cohort called "argyraspides" from the kind of shield they carried. Then came the Dahae, mounted archers, 1200 strong; then 3ooo light infantry, half of them Cretans and half Tralles. Beyond these again were 2500 Mysian bowmen, and at the end of the line a mixed force of Cyrtian slingers and Elymaean archers.

On the left of the phalanx were 1500 Gallograeci infantry and 2000 Cappadocian, similarly armed and sent by Ariarathes, next to whom were posted a miscellaneous force numbering 2700. Then came 3000 cataphracti and the king's personal cavalry, 1000 strong, with somewhat slighter protection for themselves and their horses, but otherwise closely resembling the cataphracti, made up mostly of Syrians with an admixture of Phrygians and Lydians. In front of this mass of cavalry were scythe chariots and the camels which they call dromedaries. Seated on these were Arabian archers provided with narrow swords four cubits long so that they could reach the enemy from the height on which they were perched. Beyond them again a mass of troops corresponding to those on the right wing, first Tarentines, then 2500 Gallograeci cavalry, 1000 newly enlisted Cretans, 1500 Carians and Cilicians similarly armed, and the same number of Tralles. Then came 4000 caetrati, Pisidians, Pamphylians and Lydians, next to these Cyrtian and Elymaean troops equal in number to those on the right wing, and finally sixteen elephants a short distance away.

41

The king commanded the right in person, the left he placed in charge of his son Seleucus and his nephew Antipater. The centre was entrusted to three commanders, Minnio, Zeuxis and Philip; the latter was the master of the elephants. The morning haze, which as the day advanced lifted into clouds, obscured the atmosphere, and then a drizzling rain coming with the south wind wetted everything. This did not inconvenience the Romans much, but it was a serious disadvantage to the king's troops. As the Roman line was of only moderate length, the indistinctness of the light did not obstruct the view over the whole of it, and as it consisted almost entirely of heavy-armed troops, the fine rain had no effect on their weapons which were swords and javelins. The king's line, on the other hand, was of such an enormous length that it was impossible to see the wings from the centre, let alone the fact that the extremes of the line were out of sight of each other, and the wetting mist relaxed their bows and slings and the thongs of their missile spears. Antiochus trusted to his scythe chariots to throw the enemy ranks into utter confusion, but they only turned the danger against their own side. These chariots were armed in the following manner: On either side of the pole where the yoke-bar was fastened spikes were fixed which projected forward like horns, ten cubits long, so as to pierce anything that came in their way, and at each end of the yoke-bar two scythes projected, one on a level with the bar so as to cut off sideways anything it came against, the other turned towards the ground to catch those lying down or trying to get under it. Similarly two scythes pointing in opposite directions to each end of the axis of the wheels.

The chariots thus armed were stationed, as I have already said, in front of the line for had they been in the rear or the centre they must have been driven through their own men. When he saw this, Eumenes, who was quite familiar with their mode of fighting, and knew how much their assistance would be worth when once the horses were terrified, ordered the Cretan archers, the slingers and javelin men, in conjunction with some troops of cavalry, to run forward, not in close order but as loosely as possible, and discharge their missiles simultaneously from every side. What with the wounds inflicted by the missiles and the wild shouts of the assailants, this tempestuous onslaught so scared the horses that they started to gallop wildly about the field as though without bit or bridle. The light infantry and slingers and the active Cretans easily avoided them when they dashed towards them, and the cavalry increased the confusion and panic by affrighting the horses and even the camels, and to this was added the shouts of those who had not gone into action. The chariots were driven off the field, and now that this silly show was got rid of the signal was given, and both sides closed in a regular battle.

42

These useless shams, however, were soon to prove the cause of a real disaster. The auxiliary troops who were posted in reserve next to them were so demoralised by the panic and confusion of the chariots that they took to flight and exposed the whole line as far as the cataphracti. Now that the reserves were broken the Roman horse made a charge against these, and many of them did not await even the first shock, some were routed, others owing to the weight of their mail armour were caught and killed. Then the remainder of the left wing entirely gave way, and when the auxiliaries who were stationed between the cavalry and the phalanx were thrown into disorder the demoralisation reached the centre. Here the ranks were broken and they were prevented from using their extraordinarily long spears-the Macedonians call them "sarisae" - by their own comrades who ran back for shelter amongst them. Whilst they were in this disorder the Romans advanced against them and discharged their javelins. Even the elephants posted between the divisions of the phalanx did not deter them, accustomed as they were in the African wars to evade the charge of the beast and attack its sides with their javelins or, if they could get nearer to it, hamstring it with their swords. The centre front was now almost entirely beaten down and the reserves, having been outflanked, were being cut down from the rear. At this juncture the Romans heard in another part of the field the cries of their own men in flight, almost at the very gates of their camp. Antiochus from his position on his right wing had noticed that the Romans, trusting to the protection of the river, had only four squadrons of cavalry in position there, and these, keeping in touch with their infantry. had left the bank of the river exposed. He attacked this part of the line with his auxiliaries and cataphracti, and not only forced back their front, but wheeling round along the river, pressed on their flank until the cavalry were put to flight and the infantry, who were next to them, were driven with them in headlong flight to their camp.

43

The camp was in charge of a military tribune, M. Aemilius, son of the M. Lepidus who a few years later was made Pontifex Maximus. When he saw the fugitives coming towards the camp he met them with the whole of the camp guard and ordered them to stop, then, reproving them sharply for their cowardly and disgraceful flight, he insisted on their returning to the battle and warned them that if they did not obey him they would rush blindly on to their ruin. Finally he gave his own men the order to cut down those who first came up and drive the crowd which followed them back against the enemy with their swords. The greater fear overcame the less. The danger which threatened them on either